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In Finnish legal history, there has been no case concerning the individual liability for business involvement
in international crimes. Actually, so far, only one case on the individual liability for an international crime (in
sensu stricto, ‘core crimes’) has been adjudicated in criminal proceedings in Finland, namely Prosecutor vs.
Francois Bazaramba, in which the accused Rwandan citizen was sentenced for genocide committed in
Rwanda1.
Neither has there been much public or scientific discussion on the liability for business involvement in
international crimes. However, on assignment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a research project on the
relationship between business and corporate activities and human rights was carried out by the Erik Castrén
Institute of International Law and Human Rights in the University of Helsinki in 20082. It relied heavily on
John Ruggie’s report on the subject for the United Nations (UN)3. The research report ends with a number of
recommendations particularly directed at the Finnish Government and at various public authorities. The
recommendations called for a more active role of the government authorities towards the issue of human
rights in order to assist Finnish corporations to become more responsible actors.
2. General Remarks on the Regulation of International Crimes in Finnish Criminal Law
The international crimes (‘core crimes’) defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC
Statute) were implemented into the Finnish Criminal Code (CC)4 in 2008. These provisions in Chapter 11 of
the Criminal Code cover genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in line with the ICC Statute, but
their definitions are not identical. For instance, the Finnish interpretation of the legality principle and its sub-
principle lex certa prevented the use of such an open phrase as ‘other inhumane acts…’ in the definition of
crimes against humanity (cf. Article 7, Sub-paragraph 1.k in the ICC Statute).
Chapter 11 of the Criminal Code also includes, amongst others, provisions on aggression (Section 4a, as added
into the Code by Act No. 1718/2015) and on torture (Section 9a, as added by Act No. 990/2009).
The general doctrines of the Criminal Code, as amended by Act No. 515/2003 in Chapters 3–5 of the Code, are
also applicable as such to international crimes. However, there are special provisions in Sections 12–14 of
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Chapter 11 of the Criminal Code on the responsibility of commanders and other superiors, as well as on the
superior orders, which correspond to Articles 28 and 33 in the ICC Statute.
3. Individual Modes of Responsibility and Corporate Liability in Finnish Criminal Law
3.1 Basic Forms of Criminal Responsibility
Chapter 5 of the Finnish Criminal Code (Act No. 515/2003) includes provisions on attempt and complicity
(see below). The complicity provisions follow substantially the model of the German Criminal Code. In the
recodification of the Finnish criminal law in 1990–2003, the complicity provisions were mainly retained such
as they had been in force since the enactment of the Criminal Code in 1889.
The Finnish provisions (CC 5:3–7) differentiate between principals and co-perpetrators, on the one hand, and
inciters (instigators) and accomplices (abettors), on the other. This differentiated model of participation is in
line with the emphasis on the expressive or symbolic function of criminal law. This kind of punishment theory is
strongly supported in the Finnish and Scandinavian criminal policy. The authoritative disapproval expressed
by criminal law should be differentiated according to the various roles of the participants.
The indirect principal (commission of an offence through an agent) is also one type of perpetrator, and thus
a new clarifying provision (CC 5:4) was added into the Code in 2003 concerning the indirect principal. The
system of so-called ‘borrowed criminality’ (Akzessoritätsprinzip) is applied in the participation doctrine; i.e.,
in both types of participation, instigation and abetting, the liability is of accessorial or derivative nature.
Sections 3–8 in Chapter 5 of  the Criminal  Code apply to two or more individuals  acting in concert  in the
commission of the offence. The provisions in CC 5:3–6 define the different forms of participation:
– CC 5:3 on co-perpetration: If two or more persons have committed an intentional offence together, each
is punishable as an offender. The term ‘committed’ has been interpreted extensively in the juridical
practice. The legal literature has recommended the application of the German doctrine of ‘control over
crime’ (Tatherrschaft) in drawing the line between co-perpetration and accomplice.5
– CC 5:4 on the commission of an offence through an agent, i.e., an indirect principal (mittelbare Täterschaft):
A person is sentenced as an indirect principal if he has committed an intentional offence by using, as an
agent,  another  person  who  cannot  be  punished  for  the  said  offence  due  to  the  lack  of  criminal
responsibility or intention or due to another reason connected with the conditions for criminal liability. It
should be noted that if the immediate actor fulfils the conditions of criminal responsibility and is thus
punishable for the offence, the concept of indirect principal and CC 5:4 are not applicable, in contrast to
many  other  legal  orders  (such  as  the  German  Criminal  Code).  This  fact  does  not  exclude  that  such  a
commission of an offence through an agent could trigger a perpetrator’s responsibility (by interpreting
‘commission’ extensively).
In the only Finnish case on an international crime so far, the district court convicted the accused Francois
Bazaramba of genocide as a perpetrator, when he had, inter alia., ordered the murders of four persons on
different occasions and taken part in the attacks against Tutsis in one place and been one of the leaders of the
attacks against Tutsis in another place.6 In the reasoning, I see similarities with the ‘integral part’ doctrine as
an expanded form of commission, such as it has been developed in the practice of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.7
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– CC 5:5 on instigation: A person who intentionally persuades another person to commit an intentional
offence or to make a punishable attempt at such an act is punishable for incitement of the offence as if he
was the offender.
– CC 5:6 on aiding and abetting (accomplice): A person who, before or during the commission of an offence,
intentionally furthers the commission by another of an intentional act or of its punishable attempt,
through advice, action or otherwise, shall be sentenced for abetting on the basis of the same legal provision
as the offender. The sentence is determined in accordance with a mitigated (-> ¾) penal scale.
According  to  the  legislative  drafts  and  precedents  of  the  Supreme  Court  (KKO 2009:87 and KKO 2015:10
concerning aiding and abetting fraud or dishonesty by a debtor, respectively), an active act or omission by
the accomplice does not need to be a necessary precondition for the consequence; furthering the probability
of the commission of the offence is enough. Nor is a special intent or specific direction required; the applicable
lowest level of intention is defined in the general provision on intention (CC 3:6) by using a probability
assessment.8
– Incitement to punishable aiding and abetting is punishable as aiding and abetting.
3.2 The Mode of Corporate Criminal Liability
Corporate criminal liability was  introduced  by  the  enactment  of  Chapter  9  of  the  Criminal  Code  (Act.  No.
743/1995).9 This form of liability is applicable to a corporation, foundation or other legal entity in the
operations of which an offence has been committed if such a liability has been specifically provided in the
Criminal Code for the offence. The offence is deemed to have been committed in the operations of a
corporation  if  the  perpetrator  has  acted  on  behalf  or  for  the  benefit  of  the  corporation  and  belongs  to  its
management  or  is  in  a  service  or  employment  relationship  with  it  or  has  acted  on  assignment  by  a
representative of the corporation. An additional prerequisite is that the perpetrator has been a part of the
corporation’s statutory organ or other managerial position or has exercised actual decision-making authority
therein, or the care and diligence necessary for the prevention of the offence have not been observed in the
operations of the corporation. A corporate liability may be imposed even if the offender cannot be identified
or is otherwise left unpunished.
International crimes are not included in those specifically listed offences for which corporate criminal liability
is provided. This form of liability is mainly applicable to economic and financial offences but also, among
others, to participation in the activity of a criminal organization (CC 17:1a, 24) and to terrorist offences
(Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code). The main sanction is a corporate fine of up to 850,000 euro.
Individual criminal responsibility and the liability of legal entities are applicable cumulatively. Indictments
for both types of liability are tried independently. Imposing a corporate liability is possible even though the
individual offender cannot be identified or for another reason is left unpunished.
3.3 Other Ways of Allocating Liability for Organizational Crime
The corporate criminal liability is not the only form of liability linked to organizational crime. The criminal
liability within legal persons – i.e., the principles governing the allocation of individual criminal responsibility,
especially the liability of the heads of business – was partly regulated in 1995 (Act No. 578/1995), when special
provisions on such liability were given for labour and environmental offences (CC 47:7; 48:7).10
8 As for the intention in Finnish criminal law, see J Matikkala, ‘Nordic Intent’ in K Nuotio (ed), Festschrift in Honour of Raimo Lahti
(Forum Iuris 2007) 221–34.
9 See, generally, M Tolvanen, ‘Trust, Business Ethics and Crime Prevention – Corporate Criminal Liability in Finland’ [2009]
Fudan Law Journal 99.
10 On the interaction between these two forms of liability, see in more detail, R Lahti, ‘Über die strafrechtliche Verantwortung der
juristischen Person und die Organ- und Vertreterhaftung in Finnland’ in Festschrift für Keiichi Yamanaka (Duncker & Humblot
2017) 131–52.
A more general provision on the allocation of individual liability was included in the reformed chapter on
attempt and complicity (CC 5:8: ‘Acting on behalf of a legal person’). The guidance given in those provisions
is rather vague: ‘[I]n the allocation of liability due consideration shall be given to the position of that person,
the nature and extent of his duties and competence and also otherwise his participation in the arising and
continuation of the situation that is contrary to law’. The provision in CC 5:8 is, however, clear when
prescribing  that  the  person  who  exercises  actual  decision-making  power  in  the  legal  person  (faktischer
Geschäftsführer) is to be considered equal to the member of a statutory body or management of a corporation.
The allocation of individual criminal responsibility has in practice been the primary form of corporate
complicity in relation to the criminal liability of the corporation itself. This state of affairs can be explained
with the facts that corporate criminal liability is still a relatively young construction in Finland, and it covers
fragmentarily the offences to which it is applicable. However, it is increasingly applied to economic and
financial offences.
The practice in the allocation of individual criminal responsibility has been very much in line with the guiding
principles of Corpus Juris 2000 as formulated in the follow-up study, Article 12.11 For instance, in a recent
precedent of the Supreme Court (KKO 2016:58), members of the board of directors of a potato flakes factory
(limited company) were convicted of the impairment of the environment through gross negligence (CC 48:1),
when the effluent from the factory’s potato sludge had contaminated the environment. These directors had
omitted  their  supervisory  duties  as  members  of  the  company’s  board  and  were  therefore  liable  for  their
omission to prevent the contamination (in line with the provisions of CC 3:3.2 and CC 48:7). A factual division
of labour between the managing director (having the main responsibility for the factory’s operational
activities) and the board members did not exclude the supervisory duty or the board members’ liability for
the consequence.
3.4 Further Developments
When  re-codifying  of  the  Finnish  Criminal  Code,  the  legislature  was  cautious  in  expanding  the  forms  of
preparation and participation. This caution is explained by the significance of the criminalization principles
and the importance of the principles of legality and culpability. When a Norwegian scholar, Erling Johannes
Husabø, critically assesses the new global rules on terrorism, he speaks about the tendencies of ‘more “pre-
activism” in criminal law’ and ‘more “subjectivism” in criminal law’.12 The Finnish legislature has generally
been reluctant to incorporate these ideas in the recodification of the criminal law, although the scope of
criminalized dangerous behaviour (Gefährdungsdelikte) was enlarged in comparison with traditional criminal
law.
A  Danish  scholar,  Jørn  Vestergaard,  advised  the  Finnish  law  drafters  to  preserve  its  legal  tradition  in
regulating criminal participation, because it ‘is in accordance with important developments in terms of
continuously elaborating a doctrine which stresses the principles of lex certa and of penal restraint’. In contrast
to the Finnish (and German) type of regulation, Danish provisions on the liability for attempt and
participation are ‘rather brief and their scope is somewhat wide and indeterminate’, and the Danish Criminal
Code is based on an extreme variation of a ‘unitary perpetratorship’ (Einheitstäterbegriff): according to Danish
Penal Code § 23, Sec. 1, ‘[a] statute on a criminal offence applies to anybody who by abetting, counselling or
aiding, has participated in the action.’13 Nevertheless, the Finnish legislature was also in the 2000s compelled
11 See M Delmas-Marty and JAE Vervaele (eds), The Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States (Vol. I, Intersentia 2000)
189–210 (193).
12 E J Husabø, ‘The Implementation of New Rules on Terrorism through the Pillars of the European Union’ in EJ Husabø and A
Strandbakken (eds), Harmonization of Criminal Law in Europe (Intersentia 2005) 73–75.
13 J Vestergaard, ‘Criminal Participation in Danish Law’ in R Lahti and K Nuotio (eds), Criminal Law Theory in Transition (Finnish
Lawyers’ Publishing Company 1992) 475–90 (490). See, generally, K Nuotio, ’Participation in Crime in Nordic Criminal Laws:
Variations on a Theme’ in J Husa, K Nuotio and H Pihlajamäki (eds), Nordic Law – Between Tradition and Dynamism (Intersentia
2007) 127–52.
to make exceptions due to Finland’s international (or European) obligations in combating terrorism and
organized crime.
The Parliamentary Committees took the Government Bills concerning participation in the activity of a
criminal organization and terrorist offences under special scrutiny. These legislative proposals later led to the
enacted law provisions in CC 17:1a (participation in the activity of a criminal organization) and CC 34a:2 and
4 (preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent; promotion of the activity of a terrorist
group). The role of the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament was and continues to be important in
evaluating Government Bills from the point of view of constitutional and human rights law aspects.
The criminalization of participation in the activity of a criminal organization was regarded as a new area in
Finnish criminal law. In this situation, it was not possible to resort to the traditional doctrine on complicity
or to other established concepts of criminal law. Therefore, the principles of lex certa and of penal restraint
were of great significance. The proposals in the Government Bills, which were based on the European Union
(EU) Joint Action (participation in a criminal organization) and Framework Decision (terrorist offences) were
revised in order to make these new participation provisions more foreseeable and to make them more
equivalent to the traditional complicity doctrine (so that the liability for complicity should also, in these cases,
be derivative). At the same time, the loyal implementation of those EU instruments was sought.14 The
statutory definition of the participation in the activity of an organized criminal group was revised in 2015
(Chapter 17, Section 1a of the Criminal Code, Act No. 564/2015).
The definition of a terrorist group is provided by Chapter 34a, Section 6 of the Criminal Code. The provisions
on terrorist offences (Chapter 34a) were adopted due to the national implementation of the Framework
Decision (FD) of the EU of 2002 by Act No. 13/2003. Accordingly, the definitions and the provisions in this
new Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code are, on the whole, harmonized with the relevant FD. The definition in
question reads as follows: ‘A terrorist group refers to a structured group of at least three persons established
over a period of time and acting in concert in order to commit offences referred to in CC 34a:1.’
It should be noted that, in Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code, terrorism as such has not been defined. Instead,
the chapter defines the constituent elements of terrorist acts. As for the basic offence (CC 34a:1), there must
be ‘terrorist intent’ as defined in CC 34a:6, and the offender’s activity must be likely to cause serious harm to
a State or an international organization, and his activity must fulfil the criteria of some of the common crimes
listed in CC 34a:1.1. These kinds of terrorist offences can be regarded as exceptionally aggravated offences.
Because the pressure towards expanding criminal liability has originated from international and European
(EU) obligations in combating terrorism and organized crime, critical voices have often been directed against
the legitimacy of those tendencies. When expanding criminal liability, there is often too much reliance on the
use of extensive criminalizations and the deterrent effects of severe punishments and too little reliance on
research and the rational consideration of what kinds of measures are the most effective in crime prevention
and what is needed in order to secure fair and humane criminal proceedings across state borders.15
4. Forms of Complicity in ‘Macro-delinquency’ and the Role of International Criminal Courts
I start with some general comments on the differentiation of international criminal law and harmonizing the
general principles of this specific area of law. This kind of diversification of various areas of law is reflected
14 Statements of the Constitutional Committee, No 10/2000 (concerning Government Bill No 183/1999) and No 48/2002 (concerning
Government Bill No 188/2002).
15 As  to  critical  voices  against  certain  features  of  the  recent  developments  of  criminal  law,  see  eg  R  Lahti,  ‘Towards
Internationalization and Europeanization of Criminal Policy and Criminal Justice’ in E W Pƚywaczewski (ed), Current Problems of
the Penal Law and Criminology (Wolters Kluwer Polska 2012) 365–79; R Lahti, ‘Towards a Rational and Humane Criminal Policy’
(2000) 1 Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 141; K Nuotio, ‘On the Significance of Criminal
Justice for a Europe “United in Diversity”’ in K Nuotio (ed), Europe in Search of ‘Meaning and Purpose’ (University of Helsinki 2004)
171–211; S Melander, ‘The Implementation of the EU-based Criminal Law Instruments in Finland’ in M Hollán (ed), Towards More
Harmonised Criminal Law in the European Union (Hungarian Academy of Sciences 2004) 119–41.
in  the  pluralism  of  general  legal  doctrines  and  in  the  need  to  develop  a  more  dynamic  conceptual  and
systematic thinking in order to control many parallel legal regulations and the diversity of the regulated
phenomena.16 As for international criminal law, certain general principles have their doctrinal roots in this
area: in particular, the irrelevance of official capacity, the responsibility of commanders and other superiors
and superior orders. Complicity in international criminal law and, in particular, corporate complicity is a
complex doctrine in transition.
Already, the comparison between the Statutes of ad hoc Tribunals International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), on one hand, and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), on the other, indicates changes in the provisions concerning
superior responsibility and superior orders. Even more attention should be paid to those general principles
which are for the first time regulated in the ICC Statute, such as the provisions on individual criminal
responsibility (Article 25) as well as on the mental element (Article 30) and on mistake of fact and mistake of
law (Article 32). Following Mireille Delmas-Marty’s theoretical concepts, there may be questions about the
extent to which the elaboration of these principles of international criminal law has been conducted through
hybridization, i.e., by combining and fusing elements from both common law and continental law systems to
qualitative different outputs; another question is the extent to which the implementation of those principles
furthers the harmonization of national criminal laws.17
Individual criminal responsibility as such has been a generally recognised principle of international criminal
law since the judgements of the International Military Tribunal. Articles 25(3) and 28 of the ICC Statute define
the scope of individual criminal responsibility, covering the basic rules and the rules expanding attribution.
An important question is how the characteristics of international criminal law to create liability for acts
committed in a collective context and in a systematic manner can be adjusted to the principles of individual
responsibility and culpability. So, the attribution of criminality for such international crimes as defined in
Articles 5–8 of the ICC Statute (‘macro-delinquency’) has distinguishing features in comparison with the
individual criminal liability for ‘ordinary’ offences according to domestic criminal laws: ‘[T]he individual’s
own contribution to the harmful result is not always readily apparent.’18
Subparagraph (d) of Article 25(3) extends the liability for contributions to a collective crime or its attempt in such
a way which deviates from the civil law (Romano-Germanic) tradition when criminalizing participation in
ordinary offences. It is noteworthy that this liability form is not fully in line with the common-law concept of
‘conspiracy’ but presents a compromise formulation which was also included in a similar provision in the
anti-terrorism convention19.
A comparison between Article 7 (1) of the ICTY Statute and Article 25 (3) of the ICC Statute shows a clear
difference: While the former provides a vague and general formulation of perpetration and various models
of participation, the latter one is quite differentiated, distinguishing committing (solitary perpetration, co-
perpetration and intermediary perpetration), instigating, aiding, otherwise supporting, and inciting a crime.
Nevertheless, the provision of the ICC Statute has also proven to be unclear and contested. For instance, the
extent to which the responsibility of a party to crime is dependent on the principal perpetrator; should the
regulation be classified as representing a ‘unitary perpetration model’ instead of a ‘differential participation
model’? It was also questioned whether the doctrine of a joint criminal enterprise, which has been applied in
16 See,  generally,  R  Lahti,  ‘Towards  Harmonization  of  the  General  Principles  of  International  Criminal  Law’  in International
Criminal Law: Quo Vadis? (Association Internationale de Droit Pénal, Érès 2004) 345–49; K Nuotio, ‘Transforming International
Law and Obligations into Finnish Criminal Legislation’ (1999) 10 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 325, 346; M Delmas-
Marty, Towards a Truly Common Law. Europe as a Laboratory for Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press 2002); M Delmas-
Marty, ‘The ICC and the Interaction of International and National Legal Systems’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta and JRWD Jones (eds),
The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (vol II, Oxford University Press 2002) 1915–29.
17 See Delmas-Marty, Commentary II (n 16) 1923–29.
18 A citation from K Ambos in O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute (Nomos 1999), Article 25, margin no 3. See, in
detail, K Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law. Vol. I: Foundations and General Part (Oxford University Press 2013), ch IV.
See also A Nollkaemper and H van der Wilt (eds), System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2009).
19 See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted 9 January 1998) UNGA A/RES/52/164, annex,
Article 2(3)(c).
the ad hoc tribunal since the Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgement (IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999),20 would be a legitimate
general concept of international criminal law or whether new concepts of co-perpetration and other forms of
participation would be developed in the practice of the ICC. It is interesting that the concept of indirect
perpetration or perpetration-by-means has received a dominant position in the practice of the ICC and more
generally in the legal doctrine.21 A critical discussion on the subject has produced several monographs adding
to the recent legal literature.22
There have been cogent reasons, based on the lex certa principle and the principle to culpability (mens rea), to
limit the scope of the concept of a joint criminal enterprise. Nevertheless, the doctrine of co-perpetration
needs further clarification. From a Finnish point of view, the theory of indirect perpetration by means of
control over an organized structure should be complemented by other aspects of drawing a line between co-
perpetration and other forms of participation and superior responsibility.23 Careful note should also be taken
of the recommendation of the AIDP resolution in 2009,24 which calls upon the International Tribunals to
harmonize their application of general notions of perpetration and participation in order to develop a
coherent body of international criminal law.
A general regulation on the criminal responsibility for omission (commission by omission) was not adopted in
the ICC Statute, although it was proposed during the preparatory work. In this respect, the ICC Statute did
not follow the legislative trend of the recent reforms of Continental criminal laws (for instance, that of the
Finnish Criminal Code25).
Nevertheless, the criminal liability for omission is recognized in Article 28 concerning superior responsibility.
The responsibility of commanders and other superiors is based on customary international law, but the broad
concept as adopted in this provision can be criticized. For instance, it is questionable to draw a parallel
between the cases of knowledge and negligent ignorance of impending offences.26 The solution of the German
Code of Crimes against International Law in 2002, as well as of the amendment of the Finnish Criminal Code
in 2008 to regulate the superior responsibility in separate provisions might serve as models for how to clarify
and differentiate the contents of this general principle.27
5. Summarizing Observations on the Corporate Complicity From a Finnish Point of View
As  described  above,  there  is,  so  far,  no  court  case  in  Finland  in  which  an  entrepreneur  or  a  business
corporation were involved in international crimes. Corporate criminal liability, which is adopted in Finland,
20 The Appeals Chamber (paras 185ff) defined the forms of joint criminal enterprise in the following way: (i) the ‘basic’ form
includes cases where all participants, acting pursuant to a common purpose, share the same criminal intent and act to give effect
to that interest; (ii) the second category is essentially similar to the first one, but is characterized by the ‘systemic’ nature of the
crimes committed pursuant to the joint criminal enterprise, in the sense that it implies the existence of ‘an organized system of ill-
treatment’; (iii) the third and most controversial category, known as the ‘extended’ form of joint criminal enterprise, concerns
cases where all participants share a common intention to carry out particular criminal acts and where the principal offender
commits an act which falls outside of the intended joint criminal enterprise but which was nevertheless a ‘natural and foreseeable
consequence’  of  effecting  the  agreed  joint  criminal  enterprise.  See  in  more  detail,  eg,  N  Jain, Perpetrators and Accessories in
International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2014), chs 2.II, 3, 4 and 11.
21 On the rich legal literature see, eg, a special issue of the Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011), Vol 9, No 1, which
includes the papers presented at a symposium on ‘indirect perpetration by means of control over an organized power structure’.
See also its Foreword by G Werle and B Burghardt.
22 See, in particular, E van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (Oxford University Press 2012); Jain (n
20); M Aksenova, Complicity in International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2016).
23 As for instance, Thomas Weigend points out in his article ‘Perpetration through an Organization’ (2011) 9 JICJ 91, the existence
of an organization controlled by the perpetrator may be no more than one factor relevant for the distinction.
24 See the Resolution of the XVIII AIDP International Congress of Penal Law (Istanbul, Turkey, 20–27 September 2009), Section I
(The Expanding Forms of Preparation and Participation). On the Resolutions of the Congress, see Revue Internationale de Droit
Pénal, Vol 80, Nos 3–4/2009.
25 See Section 3 (2), Chapter 3 of the Criminal Code.
26 See further eg K Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’ in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (eds), Commentary, Vol II (n 16) 823-72; K Ambos,
Treatise on International Criminal Law, I (n 18) ch VC.
27 As to the German legislation, see G Werle and F Jessberger, ‘International Criminal Justice is Coming Home: The New German
Code of Crimes against International Law’ (2002) 13 Criminal Law Forum 191, 204.
is not extended to cover international crimes (in sensu stricto). However, the general principles (regulated in
the  Criminal  Code)  on  complicity  and  on  the  liability  of  the  heads  of  business  are  applicable  to  business
involvement in international crimes in a similar way as to other crimes. The same is true as for the general
prerequisites of criminal liability and the grounds for exemption from liability (see below Appendix 2). The
Finnish examples from court practice, which were explained above, concern economic and financial crimes.
Similar application of the general principles can be expected in relation to business involvement in
international crimes.
In her recent monograph, Marina Aksenova shows that the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts applying
international criminal law have adopted their own approaches to the modes of participation. Even within
one institution, the legal standards may differ from case to case. An illustrative example of this variation in
the court practice is the question of whether the requirement of ‘specific direction’ should be an element of
the actus reus of aiding and abetting.28 (As mentioned above, Finnish criminal law does not require such an
element.)
Harmonizing the practices of the international criminal courts in assessing the modes of participation is most
desirable. A more extensive use of the general principles of law as a legal source, and an increased resort to
comparative criminal law for recognizing those principles, could help in reaching that objective.
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